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The United States (US) Department of Justice recently has released portions of an internal inquiry report
on the investigation of an individual who had been suspected of engaging in espionage for the People's
Republic of China and against the US. The inquiry report has found that the investigation--carried out by
the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--was
"inadequate?wayward?flawed?inaccurate [and] abysmal." But what about the very public allegations
that the inquiry also was racist--based on the Taiwanese-American ethnicity of the suspect, the seeming
conflation of Taiwanese with Chinese, and the apparently premature closure on the suspect as the only
suspect?

The author of the inquiry report has found "'no evidence of racial bias.'" This finding seems to be based
on discovering no substantiated statements by DOE and FBI personnel that Taiwanese-Americans are
more likely to commit espionage than other US citizens and that the suspect in question must "have
done it" because of that suspect's ethnic identity. If this is indeed the basis of the finding, the author of
the inquiry report might well seem quite disingenuous, if not naive.

Unfortunately, in an era wherein US Government bureaucrats have been sensitized to possible
allegations of racism, sexism, and the like, the harboring of racist attitudes and other racist cognitiveemotional-motivational complexes often is distorted to pass through or otherwise evade the
bureaucrat's own censorship, the censorship of other bureaucrats, and the censorship of the mass
media and other US citizens. Sometimes, the distortion is developed and maintained concurrently with
the awareness that one may, indeed, be racist. At other times, one can be truly unaware of one's own
racism. As well, the "culture wars" and "political wars" aspects of racism allegations form a context that
distortion finds most nurturant. And in addition, there are cases wherein the individuals harboring and
acting in a racist fashion employ little or no distortion as to defend a self-ideal of not being racist but
only to be successful in achieving racist goals or other goals through achieving racist goals.

When the entire inquiry report is released, one might find information not supporting the above
analysis. It may well turn out that not only racism, but also a host of infrequently mentioned
phenomena may be salient to the quality of the DOE and FBI investigation. These phenomena would
include motives to hurt the careers of one's in-house bureaucratic competitors, to seek to look "in
charge" and competent, to protect and act on one's worldviews and ideologies, to defend the raison
d'etre of one's organization--viz., spy-hunting organizations must find spies--and to act out
psychodynamic conflicts. In fact, one might even consider jettisoning many aspects of
counterintelligence and personnel security systems altogether. (See Allen, T. D., Freeman, D. M.,
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